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A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
“The MLS LAN Project is an effort to provide government and commercial 
organizations with a cost effective, multilevel networking solution by leveraging existing 
high assurance technology”.1  Because of the requirements of this communications 
framework, the protocols that are associated with this framework must not only be 
secure, but must be demonstrably so.  To this end, this thesis will attempt to answer some 
important questions about the TCB-to-TCBE, Session Status, and TCBE-to-Session 
Server protocols.  One of the most important questions is: How sound are the protocols 
with respect to the security polices that they are expected to enforce and work within? 
To answer this requires a methodology that will increase the confidence of both 
internal developers and outside inspectors of the MLS LAN Project that the protocols 
implement the security policies of the MLS LAN.  This thesis will follow a series of steps 
that will do just that.  By developing a semiformal representation of the MLS LAN 
security policies, the MLS LAN TCB-TCBE Connection, Session Status, and TCBE-to-
Session Server Connection protocols, this thesis will build on the foundation of previous 
work and more concisely define the specifications.  These semiformal representations 
will in turn, support the construction of a more formal specification of the protocols that 
can take advantage of the protocol analysis tools and techniques that are currently 
available.  
Using the formal specifications and the formal protocol analysis techniques, we 
will analyze the protocols to provide higher assurance that they meet the desired security 
properties and to identify possible weaknesses in the protocols 
 
B. ORGANIZATION OF PAPER 
 This paper is organized into seven parts.  The first section is a simple introduction 
to the goal of this paper.  The second section, entitled background, introduces general 
background information starting with a definition of the term protocol, an explanation of 
why protocols are important, and why formal protocol analysis is a worthwhile endeavor.  
2 
                                                
The same background section continues with an extremely brief survey of the field of 
cryptographic protocol analysis.∗  Followed by an introduction to the Multilevel Secure 
Local Area Network (MLS LAN) project.1  The background section concludes with a 
description of the items that will be analyzed and how that material is presented.  The 
third section describes the methodology that drives the work presented in this paper.  The 
fourth section describes the protocol specifications for each of the analyzed protocols.  
This information is based on the comprehensive information unit mapping, which is 
described and presented in appendix A.  The presentation of the protocol specification 
information includes the requirements placed on the protocol, the entities authorized to 
participate in the protocol, the authorized packets, state transitions, and any relevant 
additional information.  The fifth section introduces the formal protocol analysis 
technique used; Strand Spaces.  This section continues by presenting the formal 
properties of the TCB-to-TCBE, Session Status, and TCBE-to-Session Server protocols 
expressed in Strand Space notation.  This information is based on the work presented in 
Appendix B.  The sixth section presents the results of the three stages of analysis, which 
correspond to the work in Appendix A, B, and C, respectively.  The final section presents 
a conclusion of the work presented. 
 
 ∗ Information in “Important Developments in Formal Protocol Analysis” is heavily based on very 
detailed papers written by Meadows and other experts in the field.  These papers are noted in the 
appropriate locations and the reader is urged to consult them. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. PROTOCOL DEFINITION 
There are various definitions of the word protocol. Webster's Revised Unabridged 
Dictionary gives one definition of protocol as “A preliminary document upon the basis of 
which negotiations are carried on”2.  The American Heritage Dictionary’s definition 
includes “A code of correct conduct”3 as one of the possibilities.  Finally, a computer 
specific dictionary gives as part of its definition “A set of formal rules describing how to 
transmit data, especially across a network.”4  All of these definitions are correct.  While 
this paper will focus on the more computer centric definition of protocol, it is more 
important for now to simply realize that protocol is just another word for 
“communication framework”.  A protocol is a way to communicate, using a set of rules 
that the participants know. 
 
B. IMPORTANCE OF PROTOCOLS 
Protocols are important because they are everywhere.  A good example of a 
protocol that people use everyday is a normal phone conversation.  The “phone call 
protocol” follows a typical protocol pattern.  The participants make a connection.  They 
authenticate each other.  They exchange information and then they terminate the 
connection.  This is just one of the many protocols people use everyday.  People use 
protocols for one simple reason: 
• Protocols make communication more effective. 
Protocols make communication more effective because they allow participants to make 
assumptions about information.  Most people use these assumptions subconsciously 
because when protocols are used as intended by honest participants they are almost 
invisible to the participants.  The participants use the assumptions that are associated with 
the protocol and simply focus on the information.  However, protocol effectiveness has a 
price.  The assumptions must be valid.  The only way to establish the validity of the 
assumptions is through some type of analysis. 
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The following summary, of an informal analysis of one part of the “phone call 
protocol” mentioned earlier, illustrates how even informal protocol analysis can 
illuminate aspects of a protocol that might be otherwise be unrealized. 
When a phone conversation ends the participants don’t just hang-up.  
Surprisingly, the participants don’t just say goodbye and hang-up.  An informal analysis 
showed that there is a “pre-goodbye” that is sent and acknowledged.  Normally the 
“hang-up” initiator sends a pre-goodbye indicator; for example “well, I should get going” 
or “It was nice talking to you”.  The actual phone conversation termination is as follows.  
A “pre-goodbye” is sent and acknowledged.  An actual goodbye is sent and 
acknowledged.  Then the participants terminate the connection. 
It is interesting to note that the absence of the “pre-goodbye” often causes 
confusion in one of the participants.  This is a trivial example done in an informal manner 
and has no scientific value for this paper.  However, it does illustrate how even informal 
protocol analysis can discover aspects of protocols that may not have been understood 
prior to the analysis. 
An interesting side note is that many successful situational-comedies are based on 
protocol analysis.  They normally develop as follows.  Someone receives some 
information and makes an erroneous assumption that leads to a humorous situation.  The 
resolution is when someone points out the erroneous assumption.  A perfect example of 
simple informal protocol mis-analysis! 
 
C. IMPORTANCE OF FORMAL PROTOCOL ANALYSIS 
Formal protocol analysis is difficult.  Needham and Schroeder5 are credited with 
first stating that fact and inadvertently proving it.  Cathy Meadows also believes that 
“security flaws in a protocol can be subtle and hard to find”.6
A perfectly natural question is: why is protocol analysis important?  Even if there 
were only honest participants using protocols, protocol analysis would still be important 
because without analysis there is no way to know for sure what the assumptions used in 
the protocol actually are.  Assumptions cover items such as who the participants are, how 
certain pieces of information should be treated, and the properties that are enforced by the 
protocol.  Additionally protocol analysis helps illuminate the assumptions used by the 
protocol itself and those used by the participants as either valid or erroneous.  Protocol 
analysis does not have to be formal to be beneficial.  In fact, people are continually 
informally analyzing protocols.  I don’t propose that we formally analysis the “phone call 
protocol”.  What I do propose is that protocols that are used for computer 
communications need to be analyzed.  Computers don’t have the ability to correctly 
evaluate information they receive when the assumptions based on the protocol that 
delivered the information are erroneous.  The need for formal protocol analysis grows as 
the level of trust placed on the system increases.  For example, in a multilevel secure 
system, when a protocol delivers two separate pieces of information - the user name Foo 
and the label Top Secret - the assumption is that the user Foo is able to read Top Secret 
information.  That is an important association. 
 
D. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS IN FORMAL PROTOCOL ANALYSIS 
 
Cryptographic Protocol Analysis
Formal Models Computational Models 
Needham-Schroeder : Dolev – Yao Model Zero-knowledge : Polynomial Reduction 
Belief Logic Communicating Algebraic 
State Approaches BAN 
S-π Calculus Machines
Model Checkers Theorem Prover 
Millen: Longley-Rigby: Meadows Kemmerer 
 




1. Cryptographic Protocol Analysis 
There are two schools in cryptographic protocol analysis.  The first, called 
computational models focuses on the security of the cryptographic algorithms 
themselves.  It uses techniques such as zero-knowledge and polynomial reduction to 
analyze the algorithm’s complexity-theoretic properties.6  The second school and this 
paper are concerned with the logical interaction of the participants of the protocol, 
independent of the cryptography used in the protocol. 
2. Formal Models 
a. Needham and Schroeder 
The paper “Using Encryption for Authentication in Large Networks of 
Computers” published in 1978 by Needham and Schroeder5 is considered by many to be 
the start of any discussion of protocol analysis.  This paper discussed three protocols.  
The first of these was a protocol with the goal of establishing interactive communication 
between two authenticated principals.  The second protocol was an authenticated one-
way communication.  The final protocol dealt with signed communication.  The impact 
of this paper on protocol analysis as a whole was not in the protocols themselves.  The 
real impact was the notion that protocols “are often subject to non-intuitive attacks which 
are not easily apparent even to a careful inspection”9.  The Needham and Schroeder paper 
inadvertently gave two examples of protocols that received extensive hand analysis by 
experts and were generally considered sound yet still contain weaknesses.10,11 
Additionally, the Needham and Schroeder paper is often sited as stating that formal 
methods could be used to assure correctness.  While this may have been the intent the 
paper actually states that protocols “are prone to extremely subtle errors that are unlikely 
to be detected in normal operation.  The need for techniques to verify the correctness of 
such protocols is great”.5  How right they were.  Ironically, formal methods were later 
used to show that both the authenticated connection protocol and the authenticated mail 
protocol had weaknesses.10,11 The fact the paper directly addresses, that creating and 
analyzing protocols is difficult, is why it is considered the start of most discussions about 




b. Dolev and Yao 
The next important step was the development of a formalization of the 
intruder model by Dolev and Yao.12  This was an important step because it was the first 
formal model of an environment that had three distinct characteristics. First of all, 
multiple executions of the protocol could be running concurrently.  Secondly, the 
cryptographic algorithms were treated as “black boxes” which obeyed a limited set of 
algebraic properties.  Lastly, and most importantly, was the model of an intruder that had 
the ability to read, alter, create, and destroy traffic as well as control some of the 
legitimate members of the system.12  This formalization of the intruder, or some variation 
of it, is used in most of the protocol analysis work done today.9  The model assumes 
several things about the abilities of the penetrator: 
The penetrator controls the network to the point that all traffic can be 
considered sent to the penetrator and received from the penetrator.  The penetrator can 
create messages as a legitimate user of the protocol as well as prevent or alter the 
messages of legitimate users.  The penetrator, equipped with the appropriate key, has the 
ability to encrypt and decrypt messages.  The penetrator can make random choices and 
create new keys.  The penetrator “can not guess a random number which is chosen from a 
sufficiently large space”.13  The penetrator cannot guess a cryptographic key that the 
penetrator does not have access to through information sent across the network. 
The abilities of the penetrator in this model contribute to the difficulty of 
protocol analysis.  “Most of the work that has been done on applying formal methods to 
cryptographic protocols has relied upon the Dolev-Yao model”.14  While the descriptions 
of the penetrator’s abilities are simple, the state space of possibilities quickly explodes.  
This paper will also use the Dolev-Yao intruder model.  Formal models based on the 
Dolev-Yao intruder model fall into three general areas: Belief logic, Communicating state 
machines, and Algebraic Approaches. 
3. Belief Logic 
A major area of research in the application of formal methods to protocol analysis 
is in the area of belief logic.6,15  This is very similar to the application of modal logics 
that have been applied in distributed systems.6  In contrast to communicating state 
8 
machines, belief logics concern themselves with statements about belief.  These 
statements about belief are based on an initial set of beliefs.  As messages are received, 
beliefs are added to the initial set. The initial set of beliefs is also expanded using 
induction.  At the end of the protocol, if the set of beliefs is “adequate” then the protocol 
is assumed to be correct. 
a. Ban Logic 
The goal of BAN logic is to define a logic of authentication to express: 
• What principals should be entitled to believe 
•  Express those beliefs precisely 
• Capture the reasoning that leads to those beliefs 
“The intended use of BAN is to analyze authentication protocols by 
deriving the beliefs that honest principals correctly executing a protocol can come to as a 
result of the protocol execution.”16  The goals of authentication are stated as follows: 
“After authentication, two principals (people, computers, services) should be entitled to 
believe that they are communicating with each other and not with intruders.”17  BAN 
logic attempts to address the problems of protocol analysis that relate directly to 
authentication protocols.  “Although authentication protocols typically have few 
messages, the composition of each message can be subtle, and the interactions between 
the messages can be complex.”17  BAN logic uses a logical syntax that has an intuitive 
structure.  This syntax contains several objects such as principals, encryption keys and 
statements.  These are used to construct statements such as the following: 
• “P believes X” 
• “P sees X” 
• “P said X” 
 
While BAN logic has been used to find previously unknown weaknesses 
in several protocols17 there are several areas that it doesn’t address.  BAN logic doesn’t 
have a formal semantic, nor a formal adversary, doesn’t address dishonest participants, 
different levels of trust and assumes perfect cryptography.  BAN Logic can be used for 
authentication proofs, but it doesn’t address confidentiality.  While BAN Logic has many 
strengths, is also has some weaknesses.18  Several other belief logics have been 
developed to address some of these areas.  Many of them are based on BAN logic 
9 
constructed by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham.17  These include: GNY19, BGYN20, 
SvO21, Kailar’s Logic of accountability22, and Wedel and Kessler’s Logic23. 
. Communicating State Machines 
Communicating State Machines are often used in the analysis of cryptographic 
protocols that incorporate the Dolev-Yao model of the penetrator.  Each protocol 
participant is modeled as a state machine which transitions state based on 
communications sent to and received from other participants of the protocol. 
5. Model Checkers 
Model checking techniques attempt to create a finite model of protocol 
that reflects the security properties the protocol attempts to provide.  Then the model is 
“checked” to verify that the property is satisfied24.  The one of the main challenges of 
model checking is containing state space explosion.  Two of the most well known model 
checking tools are described below. 
a. Millen 
Jonathan Millen’s Interrogator model is a security analysis tool that is 
based on “communicating machine transformation model with message modification 
threats.” 25  His automated tool, written in prolog, uses an exhaustive search of the 
protocol participant’s state space to attempt to locate protocol security flaws.6  Other 
similar tools have incorporated human interaction in an attempt to enhance the tools 
abilities.  On such example is the tool developed by Longley-Rigby.26
b. Meadows 
Cathy Meadows is one of the most important individuals in protocol 
analysis today.  Working at the Naval Research Laboratories (NRL) she and her staff 
have made many contributions to the field.  One of the most important of these is the 
NRL Protocol Analyzer27.  The NRL Protocol Analyzer is a formal methods tool that 
models specified protocols as communicating state machines.  One of the state machines 
is a representation of a version of the Dolev-Yao model.  The tool is used to check 
insecure states.  Some of the strengths of the NRL protocol analyzer are: Effectively 
represents the Dolev-Yao intruder, by making no assumptions about the number of: 
protocol executions, principals performing the different executions, interleaved 
executions, or times cryptographic functions are applied.9
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6. Theorem Prover 
In theorem proving the protocol itself and the desired properties of the systems 
are expressed in a formal logic.  Then using a set of axioms and inference rules the 
properties of the system can be proven or refuted.24
a. Kemmerer 
Richard Kemmerer’s approach is to use a “conventional formal 
specification language”6, specifically Ina Jo28,29 In doing so he not only is able to reap the 
benefits of the model checker but he is able to prove properties about the system using 
standard theorem proving techniques. 
 
E. MULTILEVEL SECURE LOCAL AREA NETWORK PROJECT 
Full coverage of the Multilevel Secure Local Area Network Project (MLS LAN) 
and its goals are presented in J D Wilson’s master thesis entitled: A Trusted Connection 
Framework for Multilevel Secure Local Area Networks.1  While that effort will not be 
repeated here, the following section will highlight the major issues and goals of the MLS 
LAN project as presented in Mr. Wilson’s thesis. 
Most people are aware of the military’s use of the Unclassified, Confidential, 
Secret, and Top Secret multilevel system of classification.  However, many people don’t 
realize the commercial world’s own need for a multilevel system.  If the Coca Cola 
Company only had one level of classification for information there couldn’t be a “Secret 
Recipe”.  The commercial world’s labels may be the same as the military’s labels or they 
may be different, such as “non-proprietary” and “proprietary” but the underlying need is 
the same.  That need is for a system that “enables an organization to maintain a single 
network that is sufficient to verifiably restrict access to only that data for which the user 
is both cleared and has the requirement to see, even though the network contains data at 
multiple sensitivity levels”.1  In the days of paper systems this was relatively 
straightforward.  Someone was responsible for the documents and the appropriate 
security  measures  were  used  to  store and distribute the information.  They knew who  
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could access what and checked the items in and out.  Since the transition from the paper 
based system to the electronic system there have been several attempts to design systems 
that gave the same assurances. 
While there are other solutions, the “Dedicated”, “System High” and 
“Compartmented” systems, they all fail because they are too expensive.1  Expensive is 
defined in this paper as the total combination of time, cost, and difficulty of redundant 
hardware, system administration, infrastructure management, specialized hardware, 
specialized software, or inappropriate security level granularity.  The MLS LAN is a 
proposed solution to this problem. 
“The MLS LAN Project is an effort to provide government and commercial 
organizations with a cost effective, multilevel networking solution.” 1  The MLS LAN 
has grown out of research started in 1997 at the Center for Security and Information 
Security (INFOSEC) Studies and Research (CISR) at the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) in Monterey California.  It is a project that is attempting to build a multilevel 
secure network that leverages the use of existing high assurance technology and 
commercial off the shelf products (COTS) to help minimize the expense of the system; 
which has been the main inhibiting factor in previously developed multilevel secure 
systems.  The project uses a small number of verified high assurance stand alone systems 
as the basis for the multilevel high assurance network that provides services and data to 
inexpensive “diskless” workstations.  The MLS LAN provides several guarantees.  These 
are that the MLS LAN “maintain absolute control over the mechanism that provides data 
to the users” 1 and that the MLS LAN be able to “verifiably ensure the identity and 
coinciding security factors associated with each user accessing the network.”1  
Additionally, The MLS LAN project allows “for independent evaluation under an 
accepted standard criterion”.1
The MLS LAN framework strives to provide protected communications among 
each of the components of the MLS LAN and to allow users to negotiate session level 




• Protected Communications Channel (PCC) 
• Trusted Computing Base to Trusted Computing Base Extension 
Connection (TCB-to-TCBE) 
• Session Status 
• Trusted Computing Base Extension to Session Server Connection 
(TCBE-to-Session Server) 
 
F. WHAT WILL BE ANALYZED? 
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the three protocols: the TCB-to-TCBE 
Connection, Session Status, and TCBE-to-Session Server protocols.  All three of the 
protocols rely on the conduit established by the PCC.  Presently, the PCC is a stock 
implementation of IPSec and therefore this paper will not attempt to formally analyze 
IPSec.  This paper will focus on the three protocols that depend on the PCC.  These 
protocols will be analyzed in order to increase the confidence in the completeness and 
necessity properties of the protocols themselves and to explicitly express the assumptions 
the protocols impose on the PCC channel. 
 
G. DOCUMENT STRUCTURE 
This chapter has presented a general introduction to both the need for protocol 
analysis and the important developments in the field.  The following chapter presents an 
overview of the methodology used in this application of protocol analysis.  Chapter  III 
presents the process used in mapping the original presentation of the protocols to a semi-
formal representation.  Chapter three also presents relevant findings that are discovered at 
this stage in the process.  The next chapter takes the semiformal representations from 
chapter three and presents a mapping between the different abstraction levels.  Chapter  V 
gives a general description of formal Strand Space models and then presents the Strand 
Space representations of the three analyzed protocols, along with issues that arose at this 
stage of the analysis.  The final chapter presents a summary of the findings from each 
stage of the analysis, as well as conclusions and areas of future work. 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
The main goal of this paper is to analyze the three protocols: the TCB-TCBE 
Connection, Session Status, and TCBE-to-Session Server protocols.  In order to address 
the primary goal this paper presents a methodology of how apply protocol analysis.  A 
legitimate question is why is this process necessary.  The process is necessary it allows 
one to discover properties about the protocols that might not otherwise be discovered. 
In addition the development and application of the process allows one to: 
• Highlight aspects of the protocols that could benefit from an 
increase in documented specification details. 
• Provide a simple process that could be used repeatedly during the 
development process to illustrate areas of interest. 
• Present a process that enhances the ability to prove the properties 
of the system. 
• Present a process that can prove that the system, given the 
assumptions on which it is based, has the properties that are 
attributed to it. 
 
The process presented and applied in this paper will enhance the ability of the 
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IV. PROTOCOL SPECIFICATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The MLS LAN TCB-to-TCBE, Session Status, and TCBE-to-Session Server 
protocols are all presented as part of a proposed communications framework in the 
master’s thesis by J. D. Wilson entitled: A Trusted Connection Framework For Multilevel 
Secure Local Area Network.1  The specifications of each of the aforementioned protocols 
are presented in this chapter in the following format: 
• Protocol Requirements 
• Authorized MLS LAN Entities 
• (For each Authorized Entity) 
• Authorized Messages 
• Authorized States and Transitions 
• Additional Information (If necessary) 
 
The protocol requirements section gives the requirements of the particular 
protocol quoted directly from the authoritative work by J. D. Wilson.1  The authorized 
participants section gives the MLS LAN entities that are authorized to engage in the 
protocol and any general restrictions on that use.  The next sections are provided for each 
of the MLS LAN entities that are authorized to engage in the specific protocol and 
present the guidelines that the authorized participant must implement.  These sections 
will cover the authorized messages, states and transitions, and any additional information 
that is relevant to the correct implementation of the protocol by the entity.  The 
information in this chapter is based on the comprehensive information unit mapping, 
which is described and presented in appendix A.  The specifications presented here are 
used as the basis for the development of the formal protocol specifications presented in 
chapter V. 
 
B. TCB-TO-TCBE PROTOCOL 
The TCB-to-TCBE protocol provides support for communications between a 
TCBE equipped workstation and the TCB Extension Server.1  The TCBE equipped 
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workstation uses the protocol to gain secure attention from the TCB Extension Server.  
The TCB Extension Server uses the protocol to control the actions of the TCBE.   
1. Requirements 
The protocol attempts to fulfill the following requirements from the Multilevel 
Secure Local Area Network Project: Protocol High Level Analysis Document1, Version 1 
Section 3.2. 
• TCB-to-TCBE Protocol shall only be initiated only through “secure 
attention” key from user. 
• TCB-to-TCBE Protocol shall support the trusted path security related 
operations necessary to establish the initial session such as “login” and 
“user identification and authentication” or for any specified user 
operations that require a trusted path, such as “logout”, “set session level”, 
downgrade, change user password, etc. 
• TCB-to-TCBE protocol shall allow establishment of a session only 
following activation by the user. 
• TCB-to-TCBE protocol shall control the actions of the TCBE through the 
specific TCBE state commands. 
 
2. Authorized Entities 
Given the requirements placed on the protocol, there are only two MLS LAN 
entities that are authorized to employ the TCB-to-TCBE protocol; the TCB Extension 
Server and TCBE equipped workstations. 
3. TCB Extension Server 
a. Packets 
The TCB Extension Server is only authorized to implement TCB-to-
TCBE Protocol Command Packets that have the following format. 
• TCB Identifier Header (32-bit) – Identifies the TCBE that created the 
packet. 
• Version Number(4-bit) – present version is 1 
• Response Type (4-bit) – allowed values {0,1,2} 
• 0 = No Response 
• 1 = Response with Echo 
• 2 = Response without Echo 
• Command (4-bit) – allowed values {0,1,2,3,4,5,6} 
• 0 = NOOP 
• 1 = Run 
• 2 = New 
• 3 = PCC Update 
• 4 = Resume 
• 5 = Logout 
• 6 = Disconnect 
• Payload length (8-bit) – length of Payload in 32-bit words 
• Reserved (16-bit) – set to value of zero 
• Payload (variable number of 32-bit words) – data sent to the TCBE 
 
According to the Mealy diagrams1 in Figure 2 and Figure 3 the TCB 
Extension Server may produce the following command packets:  
Table 1. Command Packet Information Presented in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
b. States and Transitions 
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authorized. 
ble 2. Authorized TCB Extension Server States (From Ref 1) 
 
  The TCB Extension Server’s states are defined by five Boolean state 
variables: Power, Connect to TCBE, User Logged In, Session Operations, and Level 
Change.  While there are 32 possible TCB Extension Server states, only six states are 
Ta
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3 and presented in their original form in Figure 2. 
F ework (From Ref 1) 
There are a finite number of authorized transitions between the TCB 
Extension Server states presented in Table 2.  These transitions are summarized in Table 
igure 2.   TCB Extension Server States for TCB-to-TCBE Fram
 
Table 3. Summary of TCB Extension Server State Transitions from Figure 2. 
 
4. TCBE Equipped Workstations 
a. Packets 
TCBE equipped workstations are only authorized to implement TCB-to-
TCBE Protocol Payload Packets that have the following format. 
• TCB Identifier Header (32-bit) – Identifies the TCBE that created the 
packet. 
• Version Number (4-bit) – present version is 1 
• Payload Type (4-bits) – allowed values {0,1,2} 
• 0 = Secure Attention Request 
• 1 = Response 
• 2 = PCC Updated 
• Payload Length (8-bit) length of Payload in 32-bit words 
• Reserved (16-bit) – set to value of zero 
• Payload (variable number of 32-bit words) – data sent to the TCB 
Extension Server 
 
According to the Mealy diagrams1 in Figure 2 and Figure 3, a TCBE 
equipped workstation may produce the following Payload packets:  
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Extension Server states, only five states are authorized. 
s (From Ref 1)  
 
here are a finite number of authorized transitions between the TCBE 
states presente
Table 4. Summary of Payload Packets Presented in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
b. States and Transitions 
The TCBE’s states are defined by three Boolean state variables: Power, 
Trusted Path Operations, and Client OS Loaded.  While there are eight possible TCB 
Table 5. Authorized TCBE State
T
d in Table 5.  These transitions are summarized in Table 6 and presented in 
their original format in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3.   TCBE States for TCB-TCBE Framework (From Ref 1) 
 
Table 6  Summary of TCBE State Transitions Presented in Figure 3 .
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C. SESSION STATUS PROTOCOL 
The impetus for the Session Status Protocol is two fold.  The first is the necessity 
for the TCB Extension Server to be able to create, modify, and delete entries in the 
Session Status Database.  The second is the necessity for other MLS LAN entities to be 
able to acquire the session status values associated with a particular MLS LAN user.   
1. Requirements  
The protocol has following requirements from the Multilevel Secure Local Area 
Network Project’s Project: Protocol High Level Analysis Document1, Version 1 Section 
3.3.  
• The Session Status Protocol shall be initiated for every instantiation or 
modification of any information concerning the status of a user’s current 
session. 
• The Session Status Protocol shall support trusted communications between 
the TCB Extension Server and the Session Database Server, which is 
responsible for the maintenance of user-session security information. 
• The Session Status Protocol shall support the encapsulation of session 
information, such as TCBE Identification Number, User Identification, 
Current Session Status, etc. 
 
2. Authorized Entities 
Given the requirements placed on the protocol, there are three MLS LAN entities 
authorized to employ the Session Status protocol: the TCB Extension Server, the Session 
Database Server, and Secure Session Servers. 
3. TCB Extension Server 
a. Packets 
The TCB Extension Server is only authorized to implement Secure 
Session Protocol Request Packets, which have the following format: 
• TCB Identifier Header (32-bit) – Identifies the TCBE that created the 
packet. (TCBE ID) 
• User Session ID (32-bit) – TCBE ID 
• Version Number (4-bit) – present version is 1 
• Command (4-bits) – allowed values {0,1,2,3} 
• 0 = Create 
• 1 = Modify 
• 2 = List 
• 3 = Delete 
• Payload Length (8-bit) length of Payload in 32-bit words 
• Reserved (16-bit) – set to value of zero 
• Payload (variable number of 32-bit words) –contains user and session 
information contained in attribute name / data as in:  
• User ID: <User ID> 
• Current Session Level: < Session level> 
• Current Integrity Level: <Integrity level> 
• Current Group Setting: <Group setting> 
• Running: <Boolean flag> 
According to the Mealy diagram in Figure 4 the TCB Extension Server 
may produce the following Session Server Protocol Request packets: 
Table 7. Session Status Protocol: TCB Extension Server Packets 
 
b. States and Transitions 
The Session Status protocol does not have states defined semantically 
within its own context but rather bases its states and transitions descriptions on subset of 
states established by the TCB-to-TCBE Protocol.  The TCB Extension Server can send a 
List packet regardless of its internal state, but is only authorized to send Modify, Create, 
or Delete packets from TCB-to-TCBE Protocol states [2], state [3], and state [5]. 
Table 8. Session Server Protocol: Authorized TCB Extension Server States 
(Adapted From Ref 1) 
 
There are a finite number of authorized transitions between the TCBE 
states presented in Table 8.  These transitions are summarized in Table 9 and are 
presented in a Mealy diagram in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.   TCB Extension Server States for Session Status Protocol (Adapted From 
Ref 1) 
 
Table 9. Summary of TCBE State Transitions Presented in Figure 4. 
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4. Session Database Server 
a. Packets 
The Session Database Server is only authorized to implement Secure 
Session Protocol Response Packets. 
• TCB Identifier Header (32-bit) – Identifies the TCBE that created the 
packet. (TCBE ID) 
• User Session ID (32-bit) – TCBE ID 
• Version Number (4-bit) – present version is 1 
• Response (4-bits) – allowed values {0,1,2} 
• 0 = ACK Response 
• 1 = NAK Response 
• 2 = Payload Response 
• Payload Length (8-bit) length of Payload in 32-bit words 
• Reserved (16-bit) – set to value of zero 
• Payload (variable number of 32-bit words) –contains user and session 
information contained in attribute name / data as in:  
• User ID: <User ID> 
• Current Session Level: < Session level> 
• Current Integrity Level: <Integrity level> 
• Current Group Setting: <Group setting> 
• Running: <Boolean flag> 
• Error: <reason for failure> 
According to the Mealy diagram in Figure 5 the Session Database Server 
may produce the following Session Status protocol packets: 
Table 10. Session Database Server Response Packets 
 
b. States and Transitions 
The Session Status protocol does not have states defined semantically 
within its own context but rather bases its states and transitions descriptions on subset of 
states established by the TCB-to-TCBE Protocol.  The Session Database Server is 
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enters state [1] it is authorized receive request packets and to send response packets.  
 
There are a finite number of authorized transitions between states of the 
Session Datab
assumed to have only a single state variable POWER.  Once the Session Database server 
Table 11. Implicitly Authorized Session Database Server States 
ase Server.  These states are presented in Table 11.  The transitions are 
summarized in Table 12 and presented in the Mealy diagram in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.   Session Database Server States for the Session Status Protocol (Adapted 
 
From Ref 1) 
Table 12. Summary of State Transitions in Figure 5. 
 
D. TCBE-TO-SESSION SERVER PROTOCOL 
The TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol was developed in order to ensure that 
application layer protocols are only accessible to the appropriate users.  It facilitates this 
by providing a way for TCBE equipped workstations to provide a unique identifier to a 
server that can establish “the proper session level connectivity to the appropriate MLS 
LAN Application Protocol Server”1 
1. Requirements 
The protocol has the following requirements from the Multilevel Secure Local 
Area Network Project’s Project: Protocol High Level Analysis Document1, Version 1 
Section 3.4. 
• The TCBC-to-Session Server Protocol shall only be initiated following the 
establishment of an authorized session between the client workstation and 
the TCB. 
• The TCBC-to-Session Server Protocol shall support the encapsulation of 
information from the client workstation necessary for the identification 
and validation of the user’s session sensitivity level and application 
service request. 
• The TCBC-to-Session Server Protocol shall allow communications 
between a client and an MLS LAN Application Protocol Server only 
following positive validation of the user’s session sensitivity level and the 
authorization for the specific application service. 
 
2. Authorized Entities 
Given the requirements placed on the protocol, there are two MLS LAN entities 
authorized to employ the TCBE-to-Session Server protocol; TCBE equipped 
workstations and Secure Session Servers. 
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3. TBCE Equipped Workstations 
a. Packets 
The TCBE equipped workstation is authorized to generate TCBE-to-
Session Server Identification Packet. 
• TCB Identifier Header (32-bit) – Identifies the TCBE that created the 
packet. (TCBE ID) 
• TCBE Identification Number (32-bit) – Identifies the TCBE that created 
the packet (TCBE ID) 
• Version Number (4-bit) – present version is 1 
• Payload Length (8-bit) length of Payload in 32-bit words 
• Reserved (20-bit) – set to value of zero 
• Payload (variable number of 32-bit words) – this field is empty in this 
version of the protocol  
According to the Mealy diagram in Figure 6 the TCBE may produce the 
following TCBE-to-Session Server packets. 
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Table 13. Summary of Identification Packets Presented in Figure 6. 
. States and Transitions 





The are no states defined
n the TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol.  The protocol states referenced are 
based on the states established by the TCB-to-TCBE Protocol.  TCBE equipped 
workstations are only authorized to send TCBE-to-Session Server Identification Packets 
in state [4]. 
Table 14. TCBE-to-Session Server: Authorized TCBE States 
 
 
Figure 6.   TCBE Equipped-Workstation States for TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol 
(Adapted From Ref 1) 
 
Table 15. Summary of State Transitions Presented in Figure 6. 
 
4. Secure Session Servers 
Secure Session Servers are responsible for protecting application layer protocols 
such as FTP and HTTP from unauthorized users.  There is a one to one ratio of Secure 
Session Servers to higher layer protocols in the MLS LAN.  The server is responsible for 
validating that the user has established a session with the TCB and that the user has the 
appropriate sensitivity and integrity setting to access the application protocol. 
a. Packets 
The Secure Session Server is not authorized to produce TCBE-to-Session 
Server Protocol Packets.  It is only authorized to receive TCBE-to-Session Server 
Protocol Packets from TCBE equipped workstations. 
b. States and Transitions 
The Secure Session Server is authorized to accept TCBE-to-Session 
Server Protocol Packets in state [1].  There is only one state Boolean variable presented 
for the Secure Session Server: Power. 
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Figure 7.   Secure Session Server States for the TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol 
(Adapted From Ref 1) 
Table 17. Summary of State Transitions Presented in Figure 7. 
 
 
E. SUMMARY OF SPECIFICATIONS 
The protocols presented previously interact to form a framework that enables the 
components of the MLS LAN to securely interact.  An example of that framework is 
presented in Figure 8.  Figure 8 uses four different colors to add meaning to various 
interactions.  The two-headed blue arrows represent PCC establishment between two 
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MLS LAN entities.  The color red emphasizes areas where assumptions were made about 
protocol interactions.  Blue represents actions or processing internal to the particular 
MLS LAN entity, and the green two-headed arrow represents a connection between an 
authenticated user and an application protocol server. 
 
Figure 8.   Protocol Interaction of the MLS LAN 
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V. FORMAL PROPERTIES 
There are many techniques used in formal protocol analysis.  Each of the methods 
has both strengths and weaknesses.  Many of the most widely used methods are presented 
in the background chapter of this paper.  The method chosen for this paper is Strand 
Spaces, which was developed by F. Javier Thayer Fabrega, Jonathan Herzog, and Joshua 
Guttman.30  This chapter will give a general explanation of Strand Spaces, followed by 
the formal properties of the TCB-to-TCBE, Session Status, and TCBE-to-Session Server 
protocols expressed in Strand Space notation and presented as they relate to each entity of 
the network.  The actual conversion of the informal protocol descriptions to Strand Space 
representations is presented in appendix B. 
 
A. STRAND SPACES 
Strand Spaces is similar to model checking, while at the same time incorporating 
the ability to use induction methods as well as presenting a very intuitive graphical 
representation of protocols.  This graphical approach is “used as a heuristic for stating 
and proving correctness results.”31
 
Cryptographic Protocol Analysis 
Formal Models Computational Models 
Needham-Schroeder : Dolev – Yao Model Zero-knowledge : Polynomial Reduction 
Belief Logic Algebraic Approaches Communicating State Machines 
BAN :  S-π Calculus 
Model Checkers Induction Proofs 
Millen : Longley-Rigby : Meadows Kemmerer 
Strand Spaces 
 
Figure 9.   Strand Spaces’ Relation to Other Developments in Formal Protocol 
Analysis (Adapted From Ref 6, 7, 8) 
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Strand Spaces have several advantages.  They allow proofs that are simple, 
informative, and easily developed by hand.  The formalisms easily handle assumptions 
that are impossible for some other formal analysis methods, for example assumptions 
about freshness of nonces and session keys.  Another advantage is that it provides an 
explicit model of the intruder. 
A full description of Stand Space formalisms is presented elsewhere30,32,33,34 and 
readers are urged to consult those papers for complete coverage of the topic.  This chapter 
only presents enough of a general description of Strand Space formalisms to make the 
notation used in the following protocol descriptions understandable. 
There are seven concepts that are critical to the understanding of Strand Space 
formalisms.  Those items are presented in the following order; terms, strands, bundles, 
authorized participants, secrecy, freshness, and the penetrator model.l
1. Terms 
An important part of any protocol is the information that participants pass 
between each other.  In Strand Space formalisms these messages are referred to as terms.  
Terms have a sub-term relationship defined.  This means that a term can be made of a 
collection other terms.  Protocols define which participants should send a specific term 
and which participants should receive terms.  This is reflected in Strand Spaces by 
creating an element called a “signed” term.  The new term is actually a tuple consisting 
of either a negative sign if the participant receives the original message or a positive sign 
if the participant sends the original term.  These pairs can be represented by the form <σ, 
α> where σ is an element of the set {-, +} and α is an element of the set of all valid 
protocol messages.  A few simple examples of terms are given in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10.   Simple Examples Strand Space Terms 
 
2. Strands 
A strand is a sequence of signed terms for a particular participant.  A few 
examples of strands are given in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.   Simple Examples of Strand Space Strands 
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A strand is meant to represent a particular run of the protocol for a particular 
participant, “with specific values for all data items such as keys and nonces”.30  
Connecting signed terms creates a strand.  Each strand has a linear progression starting 
with the first term and continuing one term at a time until the final term.  Strands can 
therefore be thought of as numbered sequence of signed terms, indexed 1 through N.  The 
connection between two terms in a strand is represented by the => symbol, normally 
written vertically.  If n1 and n2 are both signed terms then n1 => n2 means that n1’s index 
number = n2’s index number -1.30
3. Bundles 
A bundle is two or more “connected” strands.  Bundles are constructed by 
connecting a positively signed term from one participant to the equivalent negatively 
signed term of another participant.  These connections are represented with a single 
arrow written between the two terms.  Therefore if both n1 and n2 are terms from 
different strands then n1 → n2 implies that n1 has a positive sign, n2 has a negative sign, 
and that the unsigned terms of n1 and n2 are equal.  An example is given in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12.   Simple Example #1 of Stand Space Bundle (Adapted From Ref 32) 
 
36 
There is another equivalent representation that incorporates participant names and 
a single term written above the bundle arrow representation.  The term is understood to 
have a positive sign in the originating strand and a negative sign in the receiving strand.  
An example of this notation is given in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.   Simple Example #2 of Strand Space Bundle (Adapted From Ref 32) 
 
This is the notation that is used in the graphical representations of protocol 
bundles in this paper. 
4. Authorized Participants 
Authorized participants are another important aspect of any protocol.  Strand 
Spaces has a clear and formal definition of the items that must be defined for these 
participants.  Each participant has a set of known information and a set of operations that 
it may perform.  The set of known items may consist of other participant’s public keys, 
established symmetric keys; the participant’s own private key, and any other initially 
known pieces of information or previously acquired knowledge.  The actions of each 
authorized participant are defined in the protocol definition.  These authorized 
operations entail all the actions necessary to fulfill the participant’s role in a successful 
run of the protocol.  These may include the ability to encrypt a message using a known 
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key, decrypt a message using a known key, create packets of a curtain form, etc.  Both 
the initially known items and the authorized operations are presented for each of the 
authorized participants. 
5. Secrecy 
Two properties that authorized participants must contend with in many protocols 
are secrecy and freshness.  In Strand Space representations the idea of secrecy is directly 
related to the terms that are sent between participants.  A piece of information is 
considered secret if two principles hold: 
• Authorized participants never send the piece of information 
• Penetrator can not derive the secret from terms that are sent 
 
6. Freshness 
Freshness of a nonce or a timestamp is modeled efficiently in Strand Spaces.  
Only the originating participant can send the original term that contains the freshness 
item.  Other participants may use this term within their normal set of operations but not 
before they have received it, thus enforcing the freshness property. 
7. Penetrator Model 
Stand Spaces has a well defined penetrator model.  The penetrator has the same 
two aspects as authorized participants; a set of initially known pieces of information and 
a set of actions that the penetrator can use to manipulate the information it knows. The 
Strand Space model of the penetrator follows the model set forth by Dolev and Yao.12  
This model gives the penetrator the ability to create, modify, and destroy any message on 
the network as long as the messages that are modified or created are possible using the 




VI. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The result of the analysis of the TCB-to-TCBE, Session Status, and TCBE-to-
Session Status protocols is presented in three sub-sections.  The first section, entitled 
Informal Protocol Description, presents areas that resulted in assumptions about the 
information relevant to the MLS LAN protocols as well as areas of particular interest.  
This section is supported by the work presented in appendix A.  The second section, 
entitled Formal Protocol Description, suggests areas of interest that arose as result of the 
creation and hand evaluation of the formal Strand Space protocol representations.  This 
section is based on the information presented in appendix B.  The third section, entitled 
Automated Tool, presents the areas addressed and the results of an analysis using 
Millen’s Constraint Analyzer.8,37,38,39  This section is based on the material presented in 
appendix C.  The three sections follow. 
 
A. INFORMAL PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION 
This section presents areas that resulted in assumptions about information 
pertaining to the protocol specifications as well as protocol areas of interest.  This section 
is organized into seven sub-sections.  The first three sub-sections entitled Terminology, 
Typographical, and Multiple Interpretations cover areas that resulted in assumptions 
about the meaning and intent of the information presented.  The final four sub-sections, 
entitled Error Handling and Undefined Interactions, Loss of the TCB-to-TCBE Protocol 
Channel, Secure Session Database RUNNING Flag, and Extraneous Abilities present 
protocol areas that of interest and how this analysis addresses those areas.  
1. Assumptions about Protocol Information 
There is a tremendous amount of information presented on the MLS LAN and the 
protocols associated with it.  Several assumptions about the meaning and intent of the 
information are made.  These assumptions follow. 
a. Terminology 
Several naming conventions were used in the documentation.  This 
resulted in a series of assumptions about name equivalency.  These assumptions ranged 
from the quite obvious such as the equivalency of TCB-to-TCBE Protocol, TCB-TCBE 
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Protocol, and TCB-TCBE Connection Protocol, to the more difficult assumptions such as 
RE(NOOP)(SL) is equivalent to RE(NOOP)(Level Change Prompt).  While these 
assumptions are relatively easy to assign correctly, the use of differing conventions can 
lead to confusion.  Every attempt was made to identify all different but equivalent 
naming conventions; based on the information provided. This type of assumption could 
be minimized if official names and representations for all of the entities and packet 
representations were standardized for the entire project.   
b. Typographical 
 A small number of questions about the meaning of the typography arose. 
We made several assumptions based on the relevant information.  For example a 
reference1 on page 141 to section 4.4.1.g is assumed to be 4.4.1.c.  This assumption is 
based on the fact that no section 4.4.1.g is included in the document and that the content 
of section 4.4.1.c addresses relevant information to the section that contained the 
reference.  Another example of typographical assumptions is the fact that the body of the 
document uses a numbering scheme for the states of the TCBE that is different from the 
numbering scheme presented in MLS LAN Connection framework.  After careful 
analysis the numbering systems were determined to be equivalent and therefore the 
analysis uses the numbering system presented in the MLS LAN Connection Framework 
documentation exclusively. 
c. Multiple Interpretations 
The PCC protocol was not a focus of this analysis.  However, it does 
illustrate a good example of possible multiple interpretations of information.  The 
presentation of the PCC is based on an implementation of IPSec and its implementation 
in the MLS LAN is presented in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.   Originally entitled: MLS LAN Protocol Datagram Packaging (From Ref 
1) 
 
The documentation states that the “MLS LAN implement[s] IPSec in a 
BITS configuration and create[s] the Protected Communications Initiator”.1  The 
documentation also states that the BITS configuration of IPSec places the IPSec 
implementation in between the native IP layer and the network drivers.  However, Figure 
14 could be construed to mean that the IP Layer is not included in the IPSec header.  If 
the PCC is implemented in the manner presently indicated in Figure 14 it would not 
satisfy the requirement of mutual “two-way” hardware identification presented in section 
3.1.1.1  This could be addressed by clearly showing that the IP layer information is 
contained in the PCC packet, if this is in fact the case.  However, it should be noted that 
the implementation of the PCC was not evaluated in this paper.  The properties that the 
PCC establishes according to the documentation are assumed to be fulfilled.  This has 
two benefits.  It allows analysis to focus on the three protocols developed by the MLS 
LAN development team that depend on the PCC.  In addition, it allows the manner in 
which the PCC provides these properties to be evaluated, modified, and changed without 
affecting the validity of the analysis done here, as long as the properties of the PCC 
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remain intact.  Once the PCC implementation has been finalized, it could be formally 
evaluated to prove that it provides the properties that the protocols evaluated in this paper 
depend on.  Some work has already been done in this area with IPSec.35,36
2. Protocol Areas of Interest 
The following areas are of particular interest as a result of the gathering of 
information and the construction of an informal protocol description. 
a. Error Handling and Undefined Interactions 
The error handling expected of the system is not explicitly stated in the 
documentation.1  Descriptions of the mechanisms and expected consequences of error 
handling are also absent.  The ability of a system to handle errors without entering a state 
that compromises the system is extremely important.  However, for the purpose of this 
analysis these mechanisms were assumed to function properly. 
There are several occasions in the protocol specifications where the 
description contains the phase: participants “will enter an interactive exchange.”1  A more 
detailed specification about the contents of the Payload section of both Command and the 
Payload packets used in this exchange would facilitate a more in depth formal analysis of 
this aspect of the protocol.  This applies to both the session level negotiation and the 
group negotiation provided by the TCB-to-TCBE protocol.  The interchange between the 
TCBE and the TCB Extension Server that constitutes the “User I&A” presented in Figure 
2 on page 128 of the documentation1 is not defined.  Assumptions were made about the 
“interactive exchanges” in order to complete the analysis. 
b. Loss of the TCB-to-TCBE Protocol Channel 
Section 3.2.1.3 on page 88, in the Systems Requirements Document, 
states: “Once the session has been established, the TCB shall not allow the TCB-to-
TCBE Protocol Channel to be broken without loss of network functionality with respect 
to shared resources, protocol services and applications provided by the MLS LAN”.1  The 
mechanisms that enable the TCB to enforce this requirement are not presented.  In order 
to complete an analysis of the protocols, these properties and the enforcement 




c. Secure Session Database RUNNING Flag 
 The entries in the Secure Session Database contain the following fields:  
USER ID; CURRENT SESSION LEVEL; CURRENT INTEGRITY LEVEL; 
CURRENT GROUP SETTING; RUNNING.  The field entitled RUNNING is a flag that 
represents whether a user has started a current session or not. The TCB Extension Server 
uses the Request packet format to change the flag’s setting.  However, the interactions 
that change the RUNNING flag and the mechanisms employed to insure its validity are 
not explicitly presented.  The documentation implicitly states that the absence of an entry 
in the Secure Session Database implies a user is “logged out”; with respect to a particular 
TCBE, and that the presence of a Secure Session Database entry implies the user is 
“logged in”.  Based on this information the RUNNING flag is assumed to be correctly 
modified when the TCB Extension Server sends a Session Status Protocol Request packet 
other that the LIST request. 
d. Extraneous Abilities 
“All TCB Entities may use the Request datagram to make query (LIST) 
requests of the Session Database Server.”1  If a TCBE is allowed to directly query the 
Session Database Server, a user might receive information about other users and their 
current settings.  Therefore, the ability of TCBE equipped workstations to directly query 
the Session Database Server should be explicitly denied.  This could be accomplish with 
the addition of the following sentences: 
• The TCBE is not allowed to make query (LIST) requests of the Session 
Database Servers. 
• The TCBE will be responsible for enforcement of this property. 
 
The analysis to this point, based on the protocol information1 and the 
assumptions developed from that information, has shown no major issues in the MLS 
LAN protocol framework or design.  
 
B. FORMAL PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION 
This section presents both assumptions about protocol information and interesting 
areas that were highlighted as a result of the creation and hand evaluation of the formal 
Strand Space protocol representations.  This section is based on the information presented 
in appendix B. 
1. Assumptions about Protocol Information 
a. PCC 
This paper presents an analysis of the TCB-to-TCBE, the Session Status, 
and the TCBE-to-Session Server protocols.  However, because all three protocols depend 
on the Protected Communications Channel (PCC) to establish “a secure interaction 
communications channel”1 and to enforce “the mutual authentication between two TCB 
entities”1, the assumptions about the PCC and how these assumptions are modeled in the 
Strand Space representation needs to be explicitly stated.  Figure 24 from appendix B 
gives a Strand Space bundle of a successful run of the protocols.  However, that Figure 
does not incorporate a representation of the PCC.  Since the present suggested 
implementation of the PCC is a version of IPSec the establishment of the PCC is treated 
as follows: Each pair of MLS LAN entities that establish a PCC channel during a single 
run of the protocols are assumed to have the symmetric keys necessary to implement that 
channel in their set of initially known items.  The notation used in the Strand Space 
formalisms to represent the PCC is given in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15.   PCC Strand Space Representation 
 
b. Version Numbering 
A version number is included in each of the analyzed protocols.  Presently 
there is only a single version of each protocol, for that reason the version number for each 
protocol is set to one.  The version number is not included in any of the Strand Space 
formalisms constructed in appendix B.  If different versions of the protocols are not 
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expected to interact then the version number information contained in the protocol 
packets is extraneous.  If different versions of the protocols are expected to interact, this 
interaction and how these differences affect the assumptions of earlier implementations 
should be addressed as the new versions of the protocols are developed.  Different 
protocol versions, by definition, are different in some manner from previous versions and 
how the different versions of the MLS LAN protocols interact could have a profound 
effect on the security properties of the network.  
2. Areas of Interest 
a. User I&A 
The present protocol specification does not explicitly define what 
constitutes the payload section of a TCB-to-TCBE protocol SAR packet.  The 
specification simply states that the variable length payload field “contains the data to be 
sent to the TCB Extension Server, typically, this will be the input from the user.”1  If the 
user name is not included in the TCB-to-TCBE protocol SAR packet a user could 
possibly again access to another users session, see Figure 16.  Figure 16 also assumes that 
the time between the logout of user A and user F being allowed to connect to a network 
application server using user A’s settings is less than the time needed by the mechanism 
that detects PCC lost.  It also assumes that there is no mechanism within the TCB 
Extension Server, which changes the interaction between the TCB Extension Server and 
the Session Database Server when two different PCCs are established from the same 
TCBE.  These are not trivial assumptions and protection mechanisms already in place 
may make the assumptions stated earlier impossible.  However, future formal analysis 
efforts might benefit from additional detail regarding the payload field contents of the 










b. TCB Extension Server – Session Database Server Connection 
The loss of communications between the TCB Extension Server and the 
Session Database Server might allow unwarranted access to the MLS LAN.1  This issue 
is presented in the protocol specification.  This is an important aspect of the MLS LAN 
security framework that it will have an enormous effect on the security properties of the 
network as a whole. 
3. Constraint Checker 
The Constraint Checker is a tool developed by John Millen.  Information 
pertaining to the Constraint Checker and the process used to arrive at the following 
results is presented in appendix C. 
a. Results 
The results from the modified protocol run are just as expected.  They do 
not demonstrate any secrecy issues related to the tested terms from the protocols.  While 
these results are promising for the secrecy properties of the MLS LAN as a whole, there 
are several important items to note about the testing.  Authentication properties have not 
been included in this section of the analysis.  The assumptions about the PCC may not 
accurately represent the future or even present PCC implementation.  The analysis was 
limited to the interaction between a single TCBE, a single TCB Extension Server, a 

























This paper presented a formal protocol analysis process and the results of 
applying that process to the MLS LAN: TCB-to-TCBE, Session Status, and TCBE-to-
Session Server protocols.  The results of the analysis completed at each of the steps in the 
process were presented in chapter six. 
The first step in the process, took the information presented in the original 
documentation and formed an informal protocol specification of the three analyzed 
protocols.  This step highlighted protocol requirements as well as the MLS LAN entities 
and the messages, states, and transitions associated with the protocol.  The analysis 
completed during this process did not discover any major issues with the analyzed 
protocols.  It does present several assumptions about the meaning and intent of the 
information used in the analysis.  The assumptions were grouped into three general areas: 
terminology, typographical, and multiple interpretations.  Additionally the analysis of the 
informal protocol specification suggested areas that might benefit from additional 
specification detail.  These areas included: error handling and undefined interactions, loss 
of the TCB-to-TCBE protocol channel, the Secure Session Database RUNNING flag, and 
a possibly extraneous ability of one protocol participant. 
The second step in the process built on the assumptions, specifications, and 
analysis completed in the first step and presented the items that the creation and hand 
evaluation of the formal Strand Space representations highlighted.  Assumptions made at 
this stage of the analysis are presented in two general areas: those pertaining to the 
Protected Communications Channel (PCC) and those pertaining to protocol version 
numbering.  Additionally the analysis of the Strand Space representations suggested one 
area of interest: payload field specification detail.   
The final step in the process built on the assumptions, specifications, and 
formalisms completed in the previous steps of the process.  It transformed the Strand 
Space protocol representations into an equivalent prolog based representation, which 
allowed a secrecy property of the three MLS LAN protocols were analyzed under an 
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limited set of conditions using Dr. John Millen’s Constraint Checker.  No secrecy issues 
were uncovered in this area of the analysis. 
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VIII. FUTURE WORK 
There are several ways in which the work presented in this paper could be 
continued.  The recommendations for future work fall into four general categories: 
expanding the coverage of items within the current assumption framework, addressing 
assumptions of the analysis, expanding the scope of the analysis, and creating a mapping 
from the protocol requirements to the protocol specifications.  The rest of this section will 
suggest future work in these areas. 
 
A. EXPAND COVERAGE WITHIN ASSUMPTION FRAMEWORK 
This paper presented an analysis that is based on a set of assumptions.  Future 
work could build on that set of assumptions and expand the properties of the MLS LAN 
TCB-TCBE Connection, Session Status, and TCBE-to-Session Server Connection 
protocols analyzed.  The automated tool presented in appendix C was used to analyze 
security properties of a limited set of participants.  The set of participants could be 
expanded, which would increase the confidence in the ability of the protocols to satisfy 
security properties of the network. 
A natural extension of the specifications presented in appendix C would be to 
incorporate authentication properties, which could be analyzed with the help of 
Constraint Checker.8,38,40
 
B. ADDRESS ASSUMPTIONS OF THE ANALYSIS 
Future work could attempt to reduce the set of assumptions used in this analysis.  
This process could evaluate reasons assumptions were necessary and collect additional 
information to alleviate the need for those assumptions.  General areas that might benefit 
from this type of investigation follow: 
• Protocol Specifications. 
• Naming Conventions. 
• PCC Properties. 
• Error Handling. 
• Participant Interactions 
• Enforcement Mechanisms. 
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C. EXPAND SCOPE OF ANALYSIS 
Future work could incorporate additional protocols and MLS LAN properties in 
the analysis.  A natural addition would be to incorporate the Protected Communications 
Channel protocol in the analysis.  Once the implementation of the PCC is finalized, its 
addition to the analysis would increase the confidence in the MLS LAN as a whole. 
 
D. MAPPING PROTOCOL REQUIREMENTS TO SPECIFICATIONS 
Future work could provide a mapping between system requirements and system 
specifications.  This would provide a binding between these two levels of abstraction, 
which would enhance the ability to prove the system is a manifestation of the 
requirements.41
These are only a few of the possible future directions for this type of analysis.  
Each will have its own perils and rewards. 
APPENDIX A: MAPPING 
The primary objective of the thesis that this document supports is to formally 
analyze the MLS LAN TCB-TCBE Connection, Session Status, and TCBE-to-Session 
Server Connection protocols as they are presented by J. D. Wilson in his Master’s Thesis: 
A Trusted Connection Framework for Multilevel Secure Local Area Network.  Formally 



















Figure 17.   Protocol Analysis Process (Adapted From Ref 37) 
 
The first step is to acquire an informal protocol description that is detailed enough 
to derive a formal protocol representation.  The second step is to derive from the informal 
protocol description a formal protocol description that can be used in the analysis.  The 
third step in the process is to use the same formal language or method to create an 
intruder model that correctly reflects the environment and abilities of an intruder.  The 
next step is to apply some formal analysis, either manual manipulation or an automated 
tool, to the formal definitions from the previous steps.  The final step is to present the 
analysis results, which will either give a counter example or prove that the protocol meets 




This document presents the first step of that process: acquiring an informal 
protocol description that is detailed enough to derive a formal protocol representation.  
Acquiring the appropriate request for comments (RFC) is often all that necessary for this 
step.37  That is not an option for the present suite of protocols because they are not 
presented in that format. 
 
A. REFERENCE NUMBERING SYSTEM 
The best way to insure that the information presented in JD Wilson’s thesis is 
accurately reflected in the formal representations is to create a mapping.  This paper will 
use the term information unit (IU) to mean the smallest unit that has meaning relevant to 
the current context.  In creating a mapping from one item to another it is important to use 
the appropriate granularity.  The first challenge in creating this mapping is to determine 
the level of granularity to use for an IU.  If the granularity of the IU is too coarse, 
important details will be lost.  If the granularity is too fine, then inconsequential details 
will overwhelm the effort.  So, what constitutes a single IU in JD Wilson’s thesis?  In JD 
Wilson’s thesis some pieces of information are presented using several sentences while 
some pieces of information are presented using only one sentence.  Therefore, a single 
English sentence will be considered a single IU for mapping purposes.   
The next challenge is to determine how to reference an individual IU.  Creating an 
IU reference numbering system solves this problem.  This IU reference numbering 
system has a few requirements; easy to implement, intuitive, complete, and error 
resistant.  Considering the previous requirements the following number system was 
developed: 
• General Form: IU# = <Page Number>.s<Sentence Number> 
• Example: IU# 79.s05 
• The above example references the fifth sentence on page 79. 
 
One might wonder why the page number is incorporated into the IU reference 
number system.  The IU reference number system would be simpler if the IU were just 
numbered sequentially.  This solution should be considered because it would allow 
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someone who has the original thesis in a different format to follow the reference with 
ease.  However, this benefit is outweighed by a single disadvantage: if there is a single 
error somewhere in the numbering then every number after the error would be incorrect 
and make use of the number system invalid.  Considering that the numbering system is to 
be implemented by hand the possibility of a simple numbering error is very high.  
Including a page number makes the system more error tolerant by limiting the affect of 
an error to a single page.  Therefore a numbering system that incorporates page numbers 
into the reference number system is a better choice.  Additionally, the concern about 
other forms of the thesis is mitigated by the fact that there is only one authoritative form 
of the thesis that is readily available. 
Since the IU reference system is based on sentences and incorporates the page 
number several other considerations must be addressed to implement this system: 
• Sentences that Span Multiple Pages 
• Non-Sentence Structures 
• Title Pages, Tables of Contents, Blank Pages and Other Document 
Structures 
• Figures and Tables 
 
The original numbering follows the same numbering conventions as footnotes; 
sentence numbers are written above the period of the sentence.  Since the IU reference 
numbering system is “page based”, a sentence is numbered according to its location on 
the page on which its period is placed.  This adds to the simplicity of the system.  Every 
IU number can be found on the page that is contained in the IU number itself.  An 
example is given in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18.   Example of reference numbering across pages. 
The sentence that follows the IU reference number 027.s09 starts on page 27 with 
the words “In the future…” and ends on page 28 with the words “…the framework”, 
therefore it has the IU reference number 028.s01 rather than 027.s10. 
There are two non-sentence structures the IU reference number system needs to 
handle; those that end in a period and those that do not end in a period.  Both structures 
are used in JD Wilson’s thesis as titles or other parts of “document structure” but do not 
in themselves present additional information and therefore they are ignored. 
The reference number system needs to be complete and intuitive.  A sequential 
listing of IU numbers should be intuitively complete or incomplete by human inspection. 
Therefore, entire pages that have no individual IUs, such as title pages, tables of contents, 
and blank pages are treated as a single IU and given the following format: 
• General Form: IU# = <Page Number>.s00 
• Example: 50.s00 





Figures and tables are an important part of the information presented in JD 
Wilson’s thesis.  They are given special IU notations because they contain more 
information that a normal IU.  However, because of their unique structure they are treated 
as a single IU. 
• General Form: IU# = <Page Number>.g<graphical number> 
• Example: 105.g02 
• The above example references the graphical IU which is the 
second chart/Figure on page 105. 
 
B. INFORMATION UNIT (IU) CLASSIFICATIONS 
Each IU in JD Wilson’s thesis presents a piece of information.  In order to 
facilitate the analysis of this information each IU is mapped to a label according to the 
type of information it presented.  The impetus for this mapping is to allow the formal 
process to focus on the IUs that contain information directly related to the policies, 
requirements, and specifications presented.  The IU classifications are as follows: 
• Definition –  Gives a definition for a term 
• Document Structure –  Presents information that only deals with 
the structure of the Document 
• Extended IU –   Chart or Figure 
• Future –  Information about future work 
• Reiteration –  This IU is equivalent to another more 
authoritative IU 
• Requirement –  Gives information that pertains to a 
requirement 
• Specification –  Gives information that pertains to a 
specification 
• Policy –  Gives information that pertains to a policy 
 
C. MAPPING TO CONCISE DESCRIPTIONS 
The next step in the process could be considered a mapping or a reduction.  Each 
IU is revisited and mapped to a concise representation of the essential information 
contained in the unit.  Sometimes this information is best conveyed in a sentence 
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fragment, a list, or even a single word.  While other times the original sentence is deemed 
to be the most concise way to convey the information.  There are two reasons for this 
mapping.  The first is to reduce the IU so that the IU reference list will only contain the 
essential information.  English sentences don’t always contain just the facts.  They 
sometimes contain additional words, phrases, and ideas to tie the information to previous 
sentences and the general flow of the document.  While theses additions are necessary for 
good writing, they are not necessary for the purposes of the intended mappings and 
therefore it is advantages to simplify the IU by removing these additions.  The second 
reason to map to concise descriptions is to facilitate comparisons between IUs.  Once IUs 
are written in a concise manner it becomes easier to determine if two different IUs are 
equivalent, complementary, or contradictory. 
It is very important that the concise descriptions are simply a concentration of the 
original information that is contained in the original IU.  To ensure this requirement, an 
addition step is taken.  Each concise description is mapped to an IU classification.  This is 
done without reference to the original IU classification.  The concise description’s IU 
classification is compared to the original IU classification in order to ensure essential 
information is neither lost nor inserted inadvertently.  
 
D. REDUCTION OF INFORMATION 
JD Wilson’s thesis “using a realistic Systems Requirements Document and a High 
Level Protocol Analysis . . . presents a framework of communications protocols”.1  This 
presentation does a good job of educating the reader about the protocols by repeating the 
information in various forms and revisiting difficult points.  In addition, background 
information is presented and the document is structured to help reinforce the presentation 
of the information.  While this is an excellent way to present information and educate a 
general reader, this repetition and supporting material inhibit the creation of a concise 
mapping.  Therefore, the IU reference list collected from JD Wilson’s thesis is put 
through a reduction process.  The first step in the process is to remove information that is 
reiterated in multiple locations.  Two important questions need to be addressed before 
this process can proceed:  
59 
• Given two IUs that present the same information, how should this 
information be “reduced”? 
• How should this “reduction” be reflected in the IU reference 
numbering system? 
 
If two IUs are equivalent then either IU could be used to represent that 
information.  However, in order to implement the reduction in a simple and organized 
manner the UIs are given an authoritative structure.  The collection of IUs presented in 
JD Wilson’s thesis can be broken into four separate categories which correspond to the 
four documents.  Each section has a different purpose and publication date.  This allows 
one to establish an authoritative framework which this reduction process will follow.  The 
following is a list of the sections of the document from most authoritative to least 
authoritative: 
• MLS LAN Systems Requirement Document (pages 81 – 96) 
• MLS LAN Protocol High Level Analysis Document (pages 97 – 
112) 
• MLS LAN Connection Framework Document (pages 113 – 152) 
• Thesis Body (pages 1 – 80) 
 
Additionally, if two IUs are in the same authoritative level the lower IU number is 
more authoritative.  Given the authoritative framework described above the reduction 
process can be expressed in the following guideline:  If two IUs are equivalent, the most 
authoritative IU reference list entry will remain unchanged and the least authoritative will 
change its IU classification to <Reiteration> and its concise description to the IU number 
of the more authoritative IU.  At the end of this reduction process, the IU reference list 
will contain a representation of the information presented in JD Wilson’s thesis.  More 
importantly for this paper the IU reference list will contain a representation of the 
information presented in three areas: Policy, Requirements, and Specifications. 

























































a. Payload Packets 
Payload packets are intended to give the TCBE a way to send information 
and requests entered by the user to the TCB Extension Server.1
APPENDIX B: STRAND SPACE FORMALISMS 
This appendix presents the process that is used to convert information pertaining 
to the TCB-to-TCBE, Session Status, and TCBE-to-Session Server protocols into Strand 
Space formal specification.30  This process is presented in 4 sections:  The first of these 
sections, entitled, Protocol Terms, demonstrates how the various protocol message 
components are represented in the individual protocol terms of the Strand Space formal 
specification.  The second section, entitled Signed Terms, lists the signed terms
associated with each authorized participant.  The third section, entitled Strands, presents 
the explicit causatively associated pairs for each of the authorized protocol participants 
and then shows examples of strands for the authorized participants.  The final section, 
entitled Bundles, presents an example bundle of the three analyzed protocols.  
 
A. PROTOCOL TERMS 
The informal protocol descriptions of the TCB-to-TCBE, Session Status, and 
TCBE-to-Session Server protocols present a total of five different packet types that may 
be created by authorized participants.1  They are presented below, grouped by protocol. 
 
• TCB-to-TCBE Protocol 
Payload Packets (Sent from TCBE to the TCB Extension Server) 
Command Packets (Sent from TCB Extension Server to the TCBE) 
• Session Status Protocol  
Request Packets (Sent from TCB entity to the Session Database Server) 
Response Packets (Sent from Session Database Server to TCB entity) 
• TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol 
Identification Datagram (Sent from TCBE to Secure Session Server) 
 
 
1. TCB-to-TCBE Protocol 
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Specification Strand Space term equivalent 
TCB Identifier Header TCB_ID 
Version Number n/a <see note 1 below> 
Response Type {0,1,2} {SAR, Re, PCC_updated} 
Payload length n/a <see note 2 below> 
Reserved n/a <see note 3 below> 
Payload P_x <see note 4 below> 
 
Example composite term: {TCB_ID, SAR, P} 
 
 
b. Command Packets 
Command packets are intended to give the TCB Extension Server a way to 
send information to the user, via the TCBE, and to direct the actions of the TCBE.1
Specification Strand Space term equivalent 
TCB Identifier Header TCB_ID 
Version Number n/a <see note 1 below> 
} {NR, RE, RWOE} 
 
{TCB_ID, NR, NOOP, P} 
 Space term equivalent
Response Type {0,1,2
Command {0,1,2,3,4,5,6} {NOOP, RUN, NEW, PCC_UPDATE, 
RESUME, LOGOUT, DISCONNECT} 
Payload length n/a <see note 2 below> 
Reserved n/a <see note 3 below> 
Payload P_x <see note 4 below> 
Example composite term: 
 
 
2. Session Status Protocol  
a. Request Packets 
(Sent from TCB entity to the Session Database Server) 
Specification Strand  
User Session ID TCBE_ID <see note 5 below> 
Version Number n/a <see note 1 below> 
reate, Modify, List, Delete} 
TCB Identifier Header TCBE_ID 
Command {0,1,2,3} {C
n/a <see note 2 below> Payload length 
Reserved n/a <see note 3 below> 
Payload P_x <see note 4 below> 
 






(Sent from Session Database Server to TCB entity) 
Specificat Strand Space term equion  
ifier Header 
ion ID low> 
low> 
load_Response} 
ayload length n/a <see note 2 below> 
Reserved n/a <see note 3 below> 
ayload P_x <see note 4 below> 
ID, ACK, P} 
TCB Ide TCBE_ID 
ser Sess TCBE_ID <see note 5 be
nt
U
Version Number n/a <see note 1 be




Example composite term: {TCB_
 
3. TCBE-to-Session Server Protocol 
a. Identification Datagram 
(Sent from TCBE to Secure Session Server) 
Specification Strand Space term equivalent 
TCB Identifier Header TCBE_ID 






xample composite term: {TCB_ID} 
 
Note 1 Version number is a constant in this implementation of the protocols 
 protocol versions is not an issue.  However, the 
issue o rsion numbers for the protocols will need to 
be addressed as new versions of
Note 2 umed to be correct in received 
messag y are disca tructure, and 
therefore are not represented in the S
Note 3 rved field is not u on of the protocols.  
Therefore, it will not be represente epresentations.  As 
Version N n/a <see note 1 below> 
lePayload n/a <see note 2 below> 
eserved n/a <see note 3 below> R





f the interaction of differing ve
 the protocols are developed. 
: Payload length is a value that is ass
es, otherwise the rded by the underlying infras
trand Space terms. 
: The Rese sed in the present versi
d in the Strand Space r
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changes are made into the protocols the Reserved field inclusion in future Strand 
Space r aluated. 
Note 4 x is a descriptor of the 
inform of N 
Note 5 s the TCB .1 Since the 
inform it will on nd Space 
represe
Note 6 inition of the TCBE is equivalent to the 
definiti mation is redundant it will 
only be represented once in the Strand Space representation. 
te 7 the protocol”.1
 
B. SIGNE
There ticipa ted to the protocols of interest.  
They are: the E, the TCB 
Extension Serv Database Server, and the Secure Session Server 
 
1. TCBE: 
The following is a list of signed term
-{TCB_ID, RE, NOOP, P_user_interface_menu} 
epresentations needs to be re-ev
: The payload field is represented with a P_x where 
ation in the payload section  the packet.  Example: P_SESSIO
: “Version 1 use  ID as the User SessE ion ID”
ation is redundant ly be represented once in the Stra
ntation. 
: The def  Identification Number 
on of the TCB Identifier Header, since the infor
No : “This field is empty in Version 1 of 
D TERMS 
are four authorized par nt roles rela
 TCBE-equipped workstations, simply referred to as TCB
er, The Session 
s for the TCBE: 
+{TCB_ID, SAR, P_undefined}, 
+{TCB_ID, Re, P_SESSION} 
+{TCB_ID, Re, P_SESSION_LEVEL_CHANGE} 
+{TCB_ID, Re, P_SET_GROUP} 
+{TCB_ID, Re, P_LOGOUT} 
+{TCB_ID, Re, P_RUN} 
+{TCB_ID, PCC_updated, P_undefined}, 
+{TCB_ID}, 
-{TCB_ID, NR, NOOP, P_Session_level_information} 
-{TCB_ID, NR, RUN, P_undefined} 
-{TCB_ID, NR, LOGOUT, P_undefined} 
-{TCB_ID, NR, NOOP, P_disconnect} 
-{TCB_ID, RE, NOOP, P_username} 




 a list of signed terms for the TCB Extension Server: 
{TCB_ID, RE, NOOP, P_session_change_level} 
P_user_interface_menu} 
+{TCB_ID, List, P_undefined} 






           
-{TCB_ID, RWOE, NOOP, P_password} 
-{TCB_ID, RWOE, PCC_UPDATE, P_undefine
 
Assumed Packets: 
+{TCB_ID, Re, P_USER} 
+{TCB_ID, Re, P_PASSWORD} 
 
2. TCB Extension Server: 
The following is
 
+{TCB_ID, NR, NOOP, P_Session_level_information} 
+{TCB_ID, NR, RUN, P_undefined} 
+{TCB_ID, NR, LOGOUT, P_undefined} 
+{TCB_ID, NR, NOOP, P_disconnect} 
+{TCB_ID, NR, RESUME,P_undefined} 
+{TCB_ID, NR, NEW, P_undefined} 
+{TCB_ID, RE, NOOP, P_username} 
+
+{TCB_ID, RE, NOOP, P_group_change} 
+{TCB_ID, RE, NOOP, 
+{TCB_ID, RWOE, NOOP, P_password} 
+{TCB_ID, RWOE, PCC_UPDATE, P_undefined} 
+{TCB_ID, Create, P_SSD_info} 




-{TCB_ID, Re, P_SESSION} 
-{TCB_ID, Re, P_SESSION_LEV
P} -{TCB_ID, Re, P_SET_GROU
-{TCB_ID, Re, P_LOGOUT} 
-{TCB_ID, Re, P_RUN} 
defi-{TCB_ID, PCC_updated, P_un
 
-{TCB_ID, Request_TCB_ID, ACK, P_und
quest_TCB_ID, NAK, P_un-{TCB_ID, Re
-{TCB_ID, Request_TCB_ID, Payload, P_SSD_info} 
 
ASSUMED PACKETS: 
-{TCB_ID, Re, P_USER} 
-{TCB_ID, Re, P_PASSWORD} 
 
                                      
traneous Abilities on page 43 ¥ See Ex
3. Session Database Server: 
104 
 Database Server: 
t_TCB_ID, ACK, P_undefined} 
ID, NAK, P_undefined} 
load, P_SSD_info} 
TCB_ID, Create, P_SSD_info} 
 the Session Database Server: 
C. 
 participants of 
the pro ections.  The first section, entitled Associated 
Pair Li e explicatively causatively associated pairs by 
protoco satively associated pairs are pairs that are 
comprised of a negatively signed term  to a positively signed term using the => 
relationship, as shown in Figure 19.  The second section, entitled Example Strands, 
present uthorized participants of the 
protoco






-{TCB_ID, Modify, P_SSD_info} 
-{TCB_ID, List, P_undefined} 
{TCB_ID, Delete, P_undefined} -
 
 
4. Secure Session Server: 
The following is a list of signed terms for






This section presents strand relationship for each of the authorized
tocols.  This is presented in two s
sting, presents a listing of each of th
l participant.  Explicatively cau
 connected
s a few examples of full stands associated with a
l. 
 




These p s wi presented in Table 18. 
 
Format of Explicit Causative Associated Pair Listing 
air ll be presented in the format 
Table 18. 
 







b. TCB Extension Server 
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 c. Secure Session Server 
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Ex le Strands 
 
Figure 20.   Example of TCBE Strand 
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erver b. TCB Extension S
 
Figure 21.   Example of TCB Extension Server Strand 
 
c. Secure Session Server 
 
Figure 22.   Example of Secure Session Server Strand 
 
 
d. Session Database Server 
 
Figure 23.   Example of Session Database Server Strand 
 
D. BUNDLES 
This section presents an example bundle.  A bundle is formed when two or more 
strands are “connected” using the causal link representation →.  This is used to represent 
that one strand sends a term and the “connected” strand receives an equivalent term. The 
bundle in Figure 24 presents a bundle that consists of all of the protocols of interest, 
represented in black.  Additionally, user interaction and other assumptions are presented 








The application of automated tools to cryptographic analysis is a valuable asset.  
Even though secrecy and mutual authentication, for the TCB-to-TCBE, Session Status, 
and TCBE-to-Session Server protocols is provided by the Protected Communications 
Channel, the application of an automated tool still has benefits.  Those benefits are two 
fold.  The first of these is by presenting a simple and efficient tool for protocol analysis; 
one provides the development team with an idea of the time cost benefit of the 
application of such tools.  Secondly, the application of such a tool increases the 
confidence in the results of the hand analysis completed in appendix B. 
The tool that is implemented was developed by John Millen and is simply called 
the Constraint Solver.  This is a natural section for use in this paper because the tool is 
based on strand space models.  The tool is based on the idea that the certain reachability 
problems for cryptographic protocols can be solved using a constraint satisfaction 
procedure.38  The tool is implemented in SWI-Prolog.39
 
A. STEPS IN THE PROCESS 
The first step in the process is to create protocol roles.  These correspond to the 
entities of the MLS LAN as well as the penetrator.  The second step is to develop a set of 
tests that have a set number of participants and a specific test term.  This analysis focuses 
on the secrecy properties of the protocols interactions; give the assumptions about the 
environment.  One important note is that the secrecy goal states that some designated 





[U,V, ...] is concatenation, n-ary 
 
) 





resetcc :-  
  retractall(cc(_)), 
  assert(cc(0)). 
 
ics(N1) :- 
  retract(cc(N)), 
  N1 is N+1, 
  assert(cc(N1)). 
 
search(B,Auth) :- % Typical reach call 
  search(B,[a,b,e],Auth). 
 
CODE IS FROM http://www.csl.sri.com/users/millen/capsl/constraints.html) 
/* 
Protocol analysis based on "Constraint Solving 
for Bounded Cryptographic Protocol Analysis" 
ACM CCS-8, 2001 
 
N-ary concatenation, but not associative 
   Elements of a cat may be cats 
Use search for convenience 
 




U*K is U pk-encrypted with K, usually pk(A) 
 
U/pk(A) is signature of U by A (not invertible) 
 
U+K is U encrypted with K as symmetric key 
 
U-K is hidden symmetric encryption (see paper
 
e is the attacker 
 
B) = msk(B,A) mutual (shared) symmetric key 
 





% resetcc resets the constraint set count to zero 
% (use it between trials) 
% ics increments it by one, used in reach 
119 
:- 





 known to attacker 
") 
 is list of send(M) and recv(M) nodes 
vings: Lin initially empty, Lout variable 
ntication tests 
y event_name OK 
e failure 
lectnode(B,send(M),B1),!, % send adds term  
). 
out,Auth) :- 
(M),B1),   % recv adds constraint 
],T,F,[recv(M)|Lin],Lout,Auth). 
e 
 set B1. 
timize, we select all send nodes first, any order. 
e send is available anyway) 
v, order does matter, so all orders 
),B1) :- 
S],B),!,     % this cut for send optimization 
). 
). % remove recv from first 
lectnode([S|B],recv(M),[S|B1]) :-  % or from some other strand 
search(B,I,Auth) 
tcc, 
  reach(B,[],I,F,[],Lout,Auth),nl, 
  write('Simple constraints:'),nl,prlist(F),nl, 
  re
  write('Trace:'),nl,prlist(Tr),nl, 




y %   Constraintlist initially empt
termlis%     Constraint is [term, 
  Terms is a list of terms% 
%     Terms initially just principal names 
  Bundle is a list of strands. (Actually a "semibundle% 
%     Strand
  Interlea% 
%   Auth is a pattern used for authe
    Auth=event_name(A1,A2,...)  an% 
%     Auth message sent causes immediate solv
    Auth=[] for no auth. test % 
% reach creates the initial list of constraints 
  from a possible merge and passes it to solve % 
 
ach(B,C,_T,F,Lin,Lin,Auth) :- re
  allnull(B), 
ics(N),   
  write(' Try '),write(N), 
 prlist(Lin), % 
  Auth =.. H,!, 










ates B into the first nod% selectnode(B,N,B1) separ
% N of some strand and the remaining strand
selectnode fails if B is all null. % 
% Note: to op
% (but usually only on
e rec% If all nodes ar
















simple [var,termlist] constraints. 
be instantiated 
e beginning. 







cords replacement constraints in C 
,T],[A,T]]) :- !.  % (pair), always safe 
!, % (pair) extended, always safe 
]]) :- !.  % (sig), always safe 











% apply reduct to each nonsimple constraint, in 
% reverse (i.e., chronological) ord
% Build up (possibly empty) list of 
% Note that reduct may cause a var to 
% on the left side of a prior constraint, so 
% tail recursion applies solve again from th
 
solve(C,C,_) :- allvarc(C),!. 
 
solve([[A,T]|C],W1,H) :-  
  solve(C,V,H), 
  remv(T,T1), 










  append(U,V,W), 
  
 
% reduct(M,T,C) performs one reduction step on 
% an active constraint M:T and  
% re
 
% "safe" steps preserve all possible solutions 
 
duct(M,T,[[M,T]]) :- re
  var(M),!.  % pass over simple constraint 
 
nstant reduct(M,T,[]) :-   % (un) with co
  atomic(M),  % always safe 





  reduct(C,T,D). 





  hunify(M,A). 
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duct(msk(e,A),T,[]).  % e knows own shared secret keys 
do_ksyn(T,T2,K,T1). 
riables from a term list, if any. 
(split) and (pdec), they're always safe. 
 (split) for pair 
:- !, % (split) extended 
 
remv(T,W). 
and binds V to pk(e) if possible (and V not already pk(e)) 
 :- 
_ksyn looks for U+K in a term list T 
r K w  in T1. 
 no c encryption. 
[U,K|T],K,[U-K|T]). 
 
reduct(sha(M),T,[[M,T]]).   % (hash) 
 
duct(pk(A),T,[[A,T]]). % public-key lookup re
 
re
reduct(msk(A,e),T,[]).   
reduct(csk(e),T,[]).  % unary form of secret key 
 
reduct(M*K,T,[[M,T],[K,T]]).  % (penc) 
 
reduct(M+K,T,[[M,T],[K,T]]). % (senc) 
 
reduct(M,T,[[M,T]]) :- 





% remv removes va
% It also does 
 
remv([],[]) :- !. 
 
remv([A|T],W) :- 
  var(A),!, 
  remv(T,W). 
 
mv([[A,B]|T],W) :- !, %re






  K==pk(e),!,  % (pdec) 





% do_ksub looks for U*V in a term list 
% 
% It fails if there is no instance to bind. 
 
do_ksub([_U*V|_T])
\+V==pk(e),   
  V=pk(e). 
 
do_ksub([_A|T]) :- do_ksub(T). 
 
% do
% and decrypts it to U.  We also insert the 
% new constraint fo ith U-K











nify(M,A) :- unify(M,A). 
----------------------------------------------------------










Y =.. [A|C], 
mutative 
 
do_ksyn([A|T],[A|T2],K,[A|T1]) :-  
  
 






% allvarc tests for simple constraint se





  var(X), 
  allvarc(C). 
 
% hunify(M,A) turns A from - to + first if necessary. 

























 X=Y.  
unify(X,Y) :- 












Y),!, \+ X == Y. 
tOccurs(X,[Y|Z]) :- !,notOccurs(X,Y),notOccurs(X,Z). 









authmatch(T,H) finds a pattern match of H to some element of T 
---------------------------------------------------------------
h(T,[[]]) :- !,fail. % no Auth pattern 
thmatch([A|T],H) :- 
) :- authmatch(T,H). 
). 
,Y), 
) :- var(Y),!,Y=X. 
r(X),!,fail. 
:- atomic(Y),!,fail. 

































  A=..AL, 
  authmatch1(AL,H),!. 
authmatch([A|T],H
]authmatch1([],[
authmatch1([X|U],[Y|V]) :-  
  authmatch1a(X
  authmatch1(U,V). 
authmatch1a(X,Y
authmatch1a(X,Y) :- va
































%Secure Database Server (SDS) is roleD 
% shares a symmetric key with the TCB Extension Server 
% which is labeled KeyBD 
%---------------------------------- 
strand(roleD,A,B,D,KeyAB,KeyBD,Na,Nb,Nd,[ 
  recv([A,Nb,list]*KeyBD), 
  send([A,Nd,nak]*KeyBD), 
  recv([A,Nb,create,settings]*KeyBD), 
2. MLS_LAN_P
% MLS_LAN_Protocols 
% Written By Daniel Craven 




%TBCE role is roleA 
% shares a symmetric key with the TCB Extension Server 












  send([A,Na,pcc]*pk(B)), 




%TCB Extension Server is roleB 
shares% 




  send([A,Nb,list]*KeyBD), 




  recv([A,Na,res,a_pass]*pk(B)), 
  send([A,Nb,create,settings]*KeyBD)
  recv([A,Nd,ack]*KeyBD), 
  send([B,Nb,echo,noop,ui_menu]*pk(A)),
  recv([A,Na,res,run]*pk(B)), 
  send([B,Nb,no_echo,pcc]*pk(A)), 















once from B (the TCB Extension 
 
s1([Sa,Sb,Sd,St]) :-  
_Na,nb,nd,Sa), 
,nd,Sb), 









  recv(X), 





%Demonstration of the trace of the proto
run % There is no penetrator in this 
%---------------------------------- 
 







%Demonstration of the trace of the pr
% penetrator in this run 












e of the prot%Demonstration of the trac
% penetrator in this run 








  strand(roleD,a,b,d,na,keyAB,keyBD,nb,_Nd,Sd), 




e %Demonstration of the trac
% penetrator in this run 
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recy of the Nonce from D (the Secure Database 
r) 
--------------------------------- 






Symmetric Key shared between A and 





emonstration of the trace of the protocols 
penetrator in this run 








penetrator in this run 





% attempting to check secrecy of the password provided 













%Demonstration of the trace of the protocols 
% penetrator in this run 
















% attempting to check secre
D  














thesis5([Sa,Sb,Sd,St]) :-  
  strand(roleA,_A,_B,_D,_KeyAB,keyBD,_Na,nb,nd,Sa)





%Demonstration of the trace of the protocols 





niversity of Amsterdam. 
ANTY. This is free software, 
itions. 




















  strand(test,a_pass,St). 
 
3. Analysis Output 
Welcome to SWI-Prolog (M
opyright (c) 1990-2003 U
ulti-threaded, Version 5.2.13) 
C
SWI-Prolog comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARR
and you are welcome to redistribute it under certain cond
log.org for details. Please visit http://www.swi-pro
 
For help, use ?- help(Topic). or ?- apropos(Word). 
 
 ?- [csolve_pl,'MLS_LAN_Protocols']. 1
W
        Singleton variables: [C] 
Warning: (c:/documents and settings/all users/desktop/prolog/wor
        Singleton variables: [A, T] 
ttings/all users/desktop/prologWarning: (c:/documents and se
     Singleton variables: [A, T]   
W
        Singleton variables: [T] 
ttings/all users/desktop/prWarning: (c:/documents and se
        Singleton variables: [T] 
Warning: (c:/documents and settings/all users/desktop/prolog/workspace/csolve_pl:303): 
        Singleton variables: [T] 
Warning: (c:/documents and settings/all users
        Singleton variables: [A] 
/worWarning: (c:/documents and settings/all users/desktop/prolog
        Singleton variables: [Y] 
Warning: (c:/documents and set
   
Warning: (c:/documents and settings/all users
        Singleton variables: [Y] 
% csolve_pl compiled 0.00 sec, 13,288 bytes 
and Warning: (c:/documents 
ls_lan_prousers/desktop/prolog/workspace/m
        Singleton variables: [KeyBD, Nd] 
 Warning: (c:/documents and
users/desktop/prolog/workspace/mls_lan_protocols:27): 
        Singleton variables: [D] 
Warning: (c:/documents 
users/desktop/prolog/workspace/mls_lan_protocols:49): 
        Singleton variables: [B, D, KeyAB, Na] 
128 
,404 bytes 
ry 1 Try 2 Try 3 Try 4 Try 5 Try 6 Try 7 Try 8 Try 9 Try 10 Try 11 Try 12 Try 13 Try 
14 Try 15 Try 16 Try 17 Try 18 Try 19 Try 20 Try 21 Try 22 Try 23 Try 24 Try 25 Try 
 34 Try 35 Try 36 Try 37 Try 
45 Try 46 Try 47 Try 48 Try 49 Try 
6 Try 
ry 59283 Try 59284 Try 






% MLS_LAN_Protocols compiled 0.00 sec, 7
 
Yes 
2 ?- thesisn(B),search(B,[]). 
Starting csolve... 
 T
26 Try 27 Try 28 Try 29 Try 30 Try 31 Try 32 Try 33 Try
38 Try 39 Try 40 Try 41 Try 42 Try 43 Try 44 Try 
50 --- <Try 51 – Try 59273 removed for space> --- Try 59274 Try 59275 Try 5927
59277 Try 59278 Try 59279 Try 59280 Try 59281 Try 59282 T






recv([a, b, _G392]) 
send([a, _G406, sar]*na) 
recv([a, _G406, sar]*na) 
send([a, nb, list]*keyAB) 
recv([a, nb, list]*keyAB) 
send([a, nd, nak]*keyAB) 
recv([a, nd, nak]*keyAB) 
send([b, nb, echo, noop, user_p]*na) 
recv([b, nb, echo, noop, user_
send([a, _G406, res, a_user]*na) 
recv([a, _G406, res, a_user]*n
send([b, nb, no_echo, noop, pass_p]*na) 
recv([b, nb, no_echo, noop, pa
send([a, _G406, res, a_pass]*na) 
recv([a, _G406, res, a_pass]*n
send([a, nb, create, settings]*keyAB) 
recv([a, nb, create, settings]*k
send([a, nd, ack]*keyAB) 
recv([a, nd, ack]*keyAB) 
send([b, nb, echo, noop, ui_menu]*na) 
recv([b, nb, echo, noop, ui_menu]*na) 
send([a, _G406, res, run]*na) 
recv([a, _G406, res, run]*na) 
send([b, nb, no_echo, pcc]*na) 
recv([b, nb, no_echo, pcc]*na) 
send([a, _G406, pcc]*na) 
recv([a, _G406, pcc]*na) 
send([b, nb, no_res, run]*na) 
recv([b, nb, no_res, run]*na) 
129 
undle: 
([a, b, _G392]), send([a, _G406, sar]*na), recv([b, nb, echo, noop, user_p]*na), 
]*na), recv([b, nb, no_echo, noop, pass_p]*na), send([a, 
ss]*na), recv([b, nb, echo, noop, ui_menu]*na), send([a, _G406, res, 
s, run]*na), send([b, nb, no_echo, pcc]*na), recv([a, _G406, pcc]*na), 
end([b, nb, no_res, run]*na)] 
*keyAB), send([a, nd, nak]*keyAB), recv([a, nb, create, 
send([a, nd, ack]*keyAB)] 
392]), send([a, _G406, sar]*na), recv([b, nb, echo|...]*na), send([a, 
... *...), send(...)|...], [recv([a, 
, nb, list]*keyAB), recv([a, nd|...]*keyAB), send([b|...]*na), 
*...), recv(...)|...], [recv([a, nb, list]*keyAB), send([a, 
*keyAB), send([...|...]*keyAB)]]  
y 6 Try 7 Try 8 Try 9 Try 10 Try 11 Try 12 Try 13 Try 
Try 19 Try 20 Try 21 Try 22 Try 23 Try 24 Try 25 Try 
ry 32 Try 33 Try 34 Try 35 Try 36 Try 37 Try 
ry 44 Try 45 Try 46 Try 47 Try 48 Try 49 Try 
 removed for space> --- 2882866 Try 2882867 Try 
2870 Try 2882871 Try 2882872 Try 2882873 Try 
 Try 2882877 Try 2882878 Try 2882879 Try 
 Try 6 Try 7 Try 8 Try 9 Try 10 Try 11 Try 12 Try 13 Try 
18 Try 19 Try 20 Try 21 Try 22 Try 23 Try 24 Try 25 Try 
 Try 31 Try 32 Try 33 Try 34 Try 35 Try 36 Try 37 Try 
 Try 43 Try 44 Try 45 Try 46 Try 47 Try 48 Try 49 Try 
82865 removed for space> --- 2882866 Try 2882867 Try 
ry 2882870 Try 2882871 Try 2882872 Try 2882873 Try 




send([a, _G406, res, a_user
_G406, res, a_pa
run]*na), recv([b, nb, no_echo, pcc]*na), send([a, _G406, pcc]*na), recv([b, nb, no_res, 
run]*na)] 
[recv([a, _G406, sar]*na), send([a, nb, list]*keyAB), recv([a, nd, nak]*keyAB), send([b, 
nb, echo, noop, user_p]*na), recv([a, _G406, res, a_user]*na), send([b, nb, no_echo, 
noop, pass_p]*na), recv([a, _G406, res, a_pass]*na), send([a, nb, create, 







B = [[recv([a, b, _G






3 ?- thesis0(B),search(B,[]). 
Starting csolve... 
 Try 1 Try 2 Try 3 Try 4 Try 5 Tr
14 Try 15 Try 16 Try 17 Try 18 
26 Try 27 Try 28 Try 29 Try 30 Try 31 T
38 Try 39 Try 40 Try 41 Try 42 Try 43 T
50 --- <Try 51 – Try 2882865
2882868 Try 2882869 Try 288




4 ?- thesis1(B),search(B,[]). 
Starting csolve... 
 Try 1 Try 2 Try 3 Try 4 Try 5
14 Try 15 Try 16 Try 17 Try 
26 Try 27 Try 28 Try 29 Try 30
38 Try 39 Try 40 Try 41 Try 42
50 --- <Try 51 – Try 28
2882868 Try 2882869 T
2882874 Try 2882875 Try 
2882880 
130 
Try 28 Try 29 Try 30 Try 31 Try 32 Try 33 Try 34 Try 35 Try 36 Try 37 Try 
tarting csolve... 
7 Try 8 Try 9 Try 10 Try 11 Try 12 Try 13 Try 
2882872 Try 2882873 Try 
882874 Try 2882875 Try 2882876 Try 2882877 Try 2882878 Try 2882879 Try 
880 
Try 2882869 Try 2882870 Try 2882871 Try 2882872 Try 2882873 Try 
882874 Try 2882875 Try 2882876 Try 2882877 Try 2882878 Try 2882879 Try 
880 
Try 2882869 Try 2882870 Try 2882871 Try 2882872 Try 2882873 Try 
 
No 
5 ?- thesis2(B),search(B,[]). 
Starting csolve... 
 Try 1 Try 2 Try 3 Try 4 Try 5 Try 6 Try 7 Try 8 Try 9 Try 10 Try 11 Try 12 Try 13 Try 
14 Try 15 Try 16 Try 17 Try 18 Try 19 Try 20 Try 21 Try 22 Try 23 Try 24 Try 25 Try 
26 Try 27 
38 Try 39 Try 40 Try 41 Try 42 Try 43 Try 44 Try 45 Try 46 Try 47 Try 48 Try 49 Try 
50 --- <Try 51 – Try 2882865 removed for space> --- 2882866 Try 2882867 Try 
2882868 Try 2882869 Try 2882870 Try 2882871 Try 2882872 Try 2882873 Try 




6 ?- thesis3(B),search(B,[]). 
S
 Try 1 Try 2 Try 3 Try 4 Try 5 Try 6 Try 
14 Try 15 Try 16 Try 17 Try 18 Try 19 Try 20 Try 21 Try 22 Try 23 Try 24 Try 25 Try 
26 Try 27 Try 28 Try 29 Try 30 Try 31 Try 32 Try 33 Try 34 Try 35 Try 36 Try 37 Try 
38 Try 39 Try 40 Try 41 Try 42 Try 43 Try 44 Try 45 Try 46 Try 47 Try 48 Try 49 Try 
50 --- <Try 51 – Try 2882865 removed for space> --- 2882866 Try 2882867 Try 





7 ?- thesis4(B),search(B,[]). 
Starting csolve... 
 Try 1 Try 2 Try 3 Try 4 Try 5 Try 6 Try 7 Try 8 Try 9 Try 10 Try 11 Try 12 Try 13 Try 
14 Try 15 Try 16 Try 17 Try 18 Try 19 Try 20 Try 21 Try 22 Try 23 Try 24 Try 25 Try 
26 Try 27 Try 28 Try 29 Try 30 Try 31 Try 32 Try 33 Try 34 Try 35 Try 36 Try 37 Try 
38 Try 39 Try 40 Try 41 Try 42 Try 43 Try 44 Try 45 Try 46 Try 47 Try 48 Try 49 Try 






8 ?- thesis5(B),search(B,[]). 
Starting csolve... 
 Try 1 Try 2 Try 3 Try 4 Try 5 Try 6 Try 7 Try 8 Try 9 Try 10 Try 11 Try 12 Try 13 Try 
14 Try 15 Try 16 Try 17 Try 18 Try 19 Try 20 Try 21 Try 22 Try 23 Try 24 Try 25 Try 
26 Try 27 Try 28 Try 29 Try 30 Try 31 Try 32 Try 33 Try 34 Try 35 Try 36 Try 37 Try 
38 Try 39 Try 40 Try 41 Try 42 Try 43 Try 44 Try 45 Try 46 Try 47 Try 48 Try 49 Try 
50 --- <Try 51 – Try 2882865 removed for space> --- 2882866 Try 2882867 Try 
2882868 
131 
882874 Try 2882875 Try 2882876 Try 2882877 Try 2882878 Try 2882879 Try 
880 
Try 2882869 Try 2882870 Try 2882871 Try 2882872 Try 2882873 Try 






9 ?- thesis6(B),search(B,[]). 
Starting csolve... 
 Try 1 Try 2 Try 3 Try 4 Try 5 Try 6 Try 7 Try 8 Try 9 Try 10 Try 11 Try 12 Try 13 Try 
14 Try 15 Try 16 Try 17 Try 18 Try 19 Try 20 Try 21 Try 22 Try 23 Try 24 Try 25 Try 
26 Try 27 Try 28 Try 29 Try 30 Try 31 Try 32 Try 33 Try 34 Try 35 Try 36 Try 37 Try 
38 Try 39 Try 40 Try 41 Try 42 Try 43 Try 44 Try 45 Try 46 Try 47 Try 48 Try 49 Try 
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